Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Peers' Performance in P2P Networks by Despotovic, Zoran & Aberer, Karl
Maximum Likelihood Estimation of
Peers’ Performance in P2P Networks
Zoran Despotovic, Karl Aberer
EPFL - Swiss Federal Institute of Technology
Lausanne, Switzerland
email:{zoran.despotovic, karl.aberer}@epfl.ch
Abstract
The problem of encouraging trustworthy behavior in
P2P online communities by managing peers’ reputa-
tions has drawn a lot of attention recently. However,
most of the proposed solutions exhibit the following two
problems: huge implementation overhead and unclear
trust related model semantics. In this paper we show
that a simple probabilistic technique, maximum likeli-
hood estimation namely, can reduce these two problems
substantially when employed as the feedback aggregation
strategy. Thus, no complex exploration of the feedback
is necessary. Instead, simple, intuitive and efficient
probabilisic estimation methods suffice.
1. Introduction
Recent empirical studies have shown that much of
eBay’s commercial success can be attributed to its rep-
utation mechanism (Feedback Forum) as a means of de-
terring dishonest behavior. Thus, [16] shows that “rep-
utation profiles are predictive of future performance”,
while [9] and [12] come up with the conclusion that
Feedback Forum completely fulfills its promises: the
positive feedback of the sellers increases their price,
while the negative one reduces it.
eBay’s Feedback Forum is just a well known exam-
ple of reputation systems [17] as informal social mech-
anisms for encouraging trustworthy behavior in online
communities. Their key presumptions are that the par-
ticipants of an online community engage in repeated
interactions and that the information about their past
doings is informative of their future performance and
as such will influence it. Thus, collecting, processing,
and disseminating the feedback about the participants’
past behavior is expected to boost their trustworthi-
ness. The mentioned eBay example confirms this ex-
pectation.
A huge body of work has appeared recently on
managing online reputations. (For a comprehensive
overview see [6] for instance). In this paper we will
be more specific and consider only P2P networks. We
will first review the relevant literature (Section 3) and
offer a view on how various P2P reputation manage-
ment approaches contribute to building trust. As we
will see, most of the them suffer from the following two
problems: huge implementation overhead and unclear
trust related model semantics. The main cause of the
first problem lies in the necessity of aggregating the
feedback about all peers in the network in order to as-
sess the trustworthiness of a single peer, while the sec-
ond problem is mainly caused by the counterintuitive
feedback aggregation strategies resulting in the outputs
that are hard to interpret. In this paper we show that
a simple probabilistic technique, maximum likelihood
estimation namely, can reduce these two problems sub-
stantially when employed as the feedback aggregation
strategy. Operating on a small fraction of the feed-
back available in the network, it lends itself to an ef-
ficient implementation. On the other hand, its out-
puts are probabilities of specific behaviors of the peers
and as such have a clear and well founded interpreta-
tion. Finally, its ability to detect peers’ misbehavior
is as strong as that of the best ones of the existing
approaches. Thus, we conclude that no complex explo-
ration of the feedback is necessary. Instead, simple and
efficient probabilisic estimation methods suffice.
However, the exact setting in which the technique
can be successfully used rules out forming huge col-
lusive groups among peers. Instead, it implies their
independent acting.
2. P2P Computational Models of Trust
In the following we introduce a general view on P2P
computational models of trust, broad enough to cover
all specific works we are aware of.
An underlying assumption of the computational
models of trust is that the peers engage in bilateral
interactions whose outcomes are evaluated on a glob-
ally agreed scale, which results in forming a directed
weighted (trust) multigraph. Its node set coincides
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with the set of peers and the set of edges with the set
of interactions between the peers. In a general form,
the weight assigned to any edge consists of an ordered
pair: a flag representing the context of the correspond-
ing interaction and the rating of the destination node
behavior in the interaction as perceived by the source.
We assume at most two possible interaction contexts:
(1) recommendations, when the destination node acts
as a recommender of other nodes capable of perform-
ing a specific task or other recommenders, and (2) the
task performances themselves. We also assume that
the latter must be present while the former is optional.
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Figure 1: Computational model of trust
Figure 1 presents an example. The way we should
understand this figure is as follows. Node a had three
interactions with node b: once node b acted as a rec-
ommender of other entities (flag r) and node a’s con-
tention with the recomendation was evaluated 0.8 and
twice node b provided the service in question to node
a (flag d) and a’s evaluations of the service provisions
were 1 and 0.9 respectively.
The core of any computational model of trust is
in the answer to the following question: how can a
given node use the information on direct and recom-
mendation experiences between the nodes, embedded
in the multigraph, to evaluate the trustworthiness of
any other node? Generally, the direct experiences of
the nodes which iteracted with the given node (nodes
u and v in the case of node j from Figure 1) should
be propagated through the graph down to the com-
putation source (node i) by using the recommendation
experiences allong the the paths to filter them out. Dif-
ferent works propose different strategies for doing this.
We classify them in Section 3. We stress that most of
the existing works do not model explicitly the context
of recommendations but rather use direct experiences
as filters. This can be thought of as weighting one’s
reports by his trustworthiness rather than his ability
to recommend.
It is important to note that the formed trust graph
does not coincide with the underlying P2P network.
We see the underlying P2P system as managing a dis-
tributed database of (data key, data value) pairs. The
problem is how to distribute this database among
the peers so that the basic database operations (e.g.
search) are efficient and the storage space required
at each peer is small in comparison with the size of
the database. Two fundamental approaches exist to
achieve this: (1) unstructured [5], in which the data
is distributed randomly over the peers and broadcast-
ing mechanisms are used for searching and (2) struc-
tured [1, 15, 19], that build up distributed, scalable
data access structures to route search requests. Hav-
ing clarified this, it should be clear that the trust
graph can be actually stored in the underlying P2P
system. In the case of an unstructured P2P over-
lay every peer can store its outgoing edges from the
trust graph (the identifier of the destination node
and possibly time stamp may act as the key), while
in the case of a structured P2P overlay the triples
(destination, source, timestamp) may act as the keys
for the trust graph edges and be stored at peers just as
dictated by the P2P network [2]. In both cases weights
of the edges may act as the values. Thus, exploring the
trust graph reduces actually to searching the underly-
ing P2P network. More specifically, retrieving feedback
about any specific peer is subdued to searching for the
data items with the keys starting with that peer’s iden-
tifier. This can be done efficiently in a structured P2P
network. In the rest of the paper we will assume this.
3. Trust Models Classification
3.1 Classification Criteria
A clear categorization of P2P computational models
of trust based on managing peers’ reputations must
consider in the first place the models’ behavior with
respect to the following three dimensions: the incurred
implementation costs, the resistance to various attacks
and the trust related model semantics.
As P2P networks normally involve millions of nodes
particular attention should be paid to cutting down
the total implementation overhead introduced by the
employed reputation management solution. Resistance
to attacks normally implies an analysis of the model
responsiveness to various forms of misbehavior of the
peers. The following two types of misbehavior are rel-
evant: independent cheating in interactions or bad-
mouthing other peers and forming collusive groups and
boosting trust values within them.
The last mentioned dimension deserves more expla-
nation as it is accompanied by quite some disagreement
in the literature. Deriving from [20], we view trust as
being inseparable from vulnerability and opportunism
associated with the interacting parties. Consequently,
we say that peer A (trustor) trusts peer B (trustee) if
the interaction generates a gain to be shared with and
by peer B and exposes peer A to a risk of loss, if peer B
takes a too large portion from the joint gain. Bulding
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on this, we see trust management as a set of actions
related to: 1) reducing the opportunism of the trustee,
2) reducing vulnerability of the trustor and after these
two issues have been properly addressed, 3) deciding if
and when to enter an interaction.
Clearly, the main goal of any reputation manage-
ment mechanism is partial or, if possible, complete re-
ducing of the opportunism of the interacting parties.
The degrees at which different mechanisms achieve this
vary. We see the following classes: social networks for-
mation, probabilistic estimation techniques and game-
theoretic models, which are discussed next.
3.2. Social Networks
This class of approaches normally implies the ag-
gregation of all reputation information available in the
formed trust network such as that from Figure 1. A
natural interpretation of this process involves the fol-
lowing steps: 1) enumerating all paths from the trust
computation source to the target node, 2) aggregating
the trust values along the paths to give a path wide
gossip and 3) merging these gossips into a final value.
Where is the exact position of this class with respect
to the tree dimensions introduced above?
Normally, their implementation overhead is high.
Because a trust-computing node has to retrieve the en-
tire trust network, the communication costs are very
high. Besides, because the number of paths between
the trust-computing source and target can be exponen-
tial, the reputation aggregation process is too costly.
These two problems are even more strongly empha-
sized if the context of recomendation is present - see
[3] for an example.
[18], modeling only direct experiences, offers impor-
tant theoretical insights on this issue by characteriz-
ing the combinations of path and across-path aggre-
gation strategies that may lead to a non-exponential
trust computation algorithm (we note that many other
works use such combinations: e.g. [14], used for Web
pages ranking, and [10]). Central to the approach is the
claim that, for specific combinations of the aggregation
strategies, exploring all the paths is equivalent to find-
ing a convergent power of the trust matrix, derived
naturally from the trust graph.1 (Here, the matrix
“multiplication”’ operation is derived from the path
and across-path aggregation operations.) However, the
proposed algorithm requires the synchronous participa-
tion of all peers, making it hardly implementable in a
P2P network. Instead, we believe that an incremental
computation is something worth further investigation.
[21] offers important insights with respect to this.
The gist of this approach consists of computing the
1It is assumed that the interaction multigraph is transformed
into a graph by aggregating first the interaction outcomes be-
tween the pairs of nodes.
trustworthiness of a given node as the average of its
performances as seen by its neighbors in the trust
graph, weighted by the trustworthiness of the neigh-
bors themselves. The authors also develop a simple
caching scheme in which the trust values of the neigh-
bors of the trust computation target are taken from
a cache (default values are used in the case of cache
miss) and their computed trust values replace the cor-
responding values existing in the cache.
How robust is this class of approaches in presence
of various misbehaviors? [10] and [21], the only works
providing informative simulation results, report good
performance of the corresponding approaches when the
fraction of malicious peers is small (below 45% approx-
imately) and the malicious peers independently cheat
in the interactions and distort their ratings of other
peers. [21] further reports the complete breakdown of
the mechanism when the cheaters take more than a half
of the overall population or when they collude. On the
contrary, [10] claims almost full effectiveness of their
mechanism when the malicious peers make the larger
fraction of the population and collude in various ways.
This results from, in our opinion, the fairly unrealis-
tic assumption that a number of pretrusted peers exist
each of whom is assigned some non-zero trust by the
rest of the community, including the malicious peers.
(This is so called “random walker” model used for Web
pages ranking.)
The computed values have unclear semantics and are
hard to interpret. They cannot be interpreted as the
(estimated) probabilities of the trustworthy behavior
of the target peers and the question what exactly they
represent is left open. Let us also mention an interest-
ing detail related to [18] and [10]: when the trust graph
is irreducible and apperiodic the powers of the corre-
sponding trust matrix converge to a matrix in which all
the rows are the same and sum up to 1 (the primary
eigenvector of the matrix). Thus the trust values of
the peers have global meaning - they are independent
of the computation source. On the other hand, because
all the values sum up to 1, it seems as if the trust was
distributed among the peers. But, if we have the values
for all the peers and they are approximately close we
are in doubt whether the whole network is trustworthy
or it is malicious.
This leads us to conclude that the computed values
lack a plausible interpretation on an absolute scale and
that the only scenarios in which they can be used must
involve ranking the trust values of many peers and se-
lection of the most trustworthy one(s) among them.
3.3. Probabilistic Estimation
Probabilistic estimation techniques present certain
improvement with respect to the meaningfulness of the
computed values. Namely, they output probability dis-
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tributions (or at least the most likely outcome) over the
set of possible behaviours of the trusted agents. The
importance of such models becomes clear if we recall
the presented view on trust - if the opportunism of the
trustee cannot be reduced completely then it becomes
important for the trustor to be able to estimate the
risks of the interaction and decides whether to enter it
or not. If the individual outcomes of the interaction
are assigned the probabilities and the trustor can as-
sign them utilities as well then this task becomes easy
- the trustor just needs to compute whether entering
the interaction has a higher utility than staying out.
In principle, it is possible to construct a probabilistic
model in which all the paths between the trust compu-
tation source and target. However, we are not aware of
any such attempt and doubt that it would suffer from
an exponential computation overhead, just as outlined
previously. But, we believe that constructing such a
model is unnecessary and that in most of the relevant
settings it is sufficient to consider only two small frac-
tions of the formed trust (multi)graph - those around
the trust computation source and target. One of the
goals of this paper is exactly to show this. Needless to
say, another clear advantage of doing the trust compu-
tation this way is its implementation efficiency.
It is a bit surprising that very few works on using
well known probabilistic estimation techniques for de-
centralized trust computation exist. [13] presents the
well-known method of Bayesian estimation as the right
probabilistic tool for assessing the future trusting per-
formance based on past interactions. Only direct in-
teractions were studied - the question of including rec-
ommendations was not considered.
[4] goes a step further by taking into account the
”second-hand” opinions also. However, the strategy
for merging own experiences with those of other wit-
nesses is intuitive (giving more weight to own experi-
ences, though plausible, is still intuitive) rather than
theoretically founded.
3.4. Game-Theoretic Models
Game-theoretic reputation models make a further
clarification in the interpretation of the agents’ trust-
worthiness in the sense that, if the reputation system
is designed properly, trust is encoded in the equilibria
of the repeated game the agents are playing. Thus, for
rational players trustworthy behaviour is enforced.
[11] presents the proper game-theoretic framework
for analyzing reputations(repeated games with incom-
plete information), while [8] offers certain characteri-
zations of the equilibria payoffs in the presence of rep-
utation effects.
[7] focuses on a specific game and derives its equi-
libria. Apart from this the author also raises ques-
tions concerning the overall game-theoretic reputation
systems design, such as incentivizing players to leave
feedback, dealing with incomplete feedback etc. How-
ever, an underlying assumption of this work is that a
central trusted authority does the feedback aggrega-
tion. We see this as a major obstacle to transferring
game-theoretic models to decentralized environments.
4. Model - Honest or Dishonest Peers
Let us now consider a P2P network consisting of
peers having associated innate probabilities of perform-
ing honestly in their interactions with others. Let θj
denote the probability of peer j. Assume that peer
j interacted with peers p1, p2, . . . , pn and its perfor-
mances in these interactions were x1, x2, . . . , xn, where
xi ∈ {0, 1} (1 denoting the honest performance and 0
the dishonest one). When asked to report on peer j’
performances witnesses p1, p2, . . . , pn may lie and mis-
report. Assuming that they lie with specific probabil-
ities, say lk for peer pk, the probability of observing
report yk from peer pk can be calculated as:
P [Yk = yk] =
{
lk(1− θj) + (1− lk)θj if yk = 1
lkθj + (1− lk)(1− θj) if yk = 0.
(4.1)
Now, given a random sample of independent reports
y1, y2, . . . , yn we have that the likelihood function of
this sample is
L(θj) = P [Y1 = y1]P [Y2 = y2] · · ·P [Yn = yn]. (4.2)
The maximum likelihood estimation procedure now im-
plies simply finding θj that maximizes this expression.
This number is the maximum likelihood estimate of
the unknown probability. Note also that the own exe-
riences are seemlessly integrated into this model - the
trust computing source peer i just has to put pi = 1
for his own experiences xi.
Let us locate this model in the three-dimensional
space introduced in Section 3.1.
First, referring back to Figure 1, if peer i is com-
puting the trustworthiness of peer j then the model as-
sumes the peer i first retrieves from peers u and v their
reports on peer j’s performances with them. (This is
the meaning of y1, y2, . . . , yn in (4.2)). Thus, the nec-
essary reputation information on which the model op-
erates consists in this case of the edges entering node
j. Keeping in mind what we said in Section 2 about
how the underlying overlay is used to store the trust
data we see that retrieving these edges (feedback) co-
incides with searching the overlay for the data items
with the keys starting with j. Further, as we will see
shortly, not all such data items have to be retrieved.
Good predictions can be achieved even with 10-20 re-
ports retrieved. We stress that this is a considerable
improvement as compared to what most of the exist-
ing approaches do - we retrieve only a small fraction of
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the feedback about the trust computation target, while
they retrieve the entire feedback about all the nodes.
On the other hand, we assume that peer i deduces
the misreporting probabilities lk from own interactions.
These ”averages” can be maintained for specific peers
(lks are different) or at the level of the whole network
(lks are all same). In the simulations below we assume
the second possibility. In this case the involved storage
costs per peer are negligible - only a single value is kept
and used to approximate the situation in the network.
Thus, in a word, the model incurs small communi-
cation overhead and virtually no storage costs.
Second, the output values of the model are probabil-
ities and as such they do have a plausible interpretation
on the absolute [0, 1] scale. Therefore, it is easy to in-
terpret and use them without comparing with the other
peers’ values.
Third, Equation (4.2) implies the independence of
the reports Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn. Thus, the assumed setting
is non-collusive and the simulation results we present
next hold for this setting. We note that extensions to
collusive settings are possible by integrating the collu-
sion possibilities into (4.2).
4.1. Simulation results
We checked the performance of the method in a va-
riety of parameter settings. As the estimation quality
measure we chose the mean absolute error of the es-
timated probabilities of the peers performing honestly
and their actual values. The following parameters are
considered: 1) the number of peers - 128 (constant
throughout the simulations), 2) the number interac-
tions per peer - varied at increments of 20 from 20 to
100, and 3) fraction of liars - varied at increments of
0.1 from 0.1 to 0.5. All the results are averaged across
20 simulation runs. The interactions among the peers
were generated at random, we did not consider any
particular structure of the resulting trust network.
Note that the second parameter, number of interac-
tions per peer, is not correlated with the numbers of
peers. For higher network sizes the same results would
be obtained with the same numbers of interactions per
peer. Put differently, the absolute amount of feedback
is what determines the results, not its relative size as
compared to the size of the network.
Figure 2 shows the results for the case when the
peers’ probabilities of performing honestly are gener-
ated at random in the interval [0, 1], while in figure
Figure 3 we show the special case when these probabil-
ities are either 1 or 0. In both cases liars were generated
so that they always lie (lk from (4.1) equals the frac-
tion of liars). We have also experimented with varying
ljs and did not observe any important difference.
We emphasize that the plots are symmetric across
the line “fraction of liars = 0.5”. This is simply a con-
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Figure 2: Simulation results - peers’
trustworthiness drawn randomly from [0,1]
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Figure 3: Simulation results - peers’
trustworthiness drawn randomly from {0,1}
sequence of the introduced probabilistic assumptions
and non-collusive peer behavior - if a peer believes that
the majority of the peers are liars then it should take
the reverse of their reports as true. Interestingly, no
existing approach exhibits this behavior.
4.2. Discussion
Let us summarize the main properties of the pro-
posed mechanism.
First, for smaller fractions of liars, the model gives
good estimates even when a small number of recent
interactions is considered (say 20 - 40). Thus, in this
setting, the method is more more responsive to changes
in peers’ behavior.
Second, the implementation overhead of the model
is as small as possible. Practically, it only implies the
small communication overhead related to retrieving the
direct experiences of the peers who interacted with the
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trust computation target.
Third, the considered setting was non-collusive; it
assumed that peers did not form collusive groups but
rather acted independently. In this setting, the mecha-
nism gives estimates of the peers’ trustworthiness with
errors within 5-10% even with 30% of liars. It performs
extremely well when it is known that the peers can be
either fully trustworthy or fully untrustworthy.
To the best of our knowledge, no existing approach
exhibits such properties. At best, they show similar
quality of the trustworthiness estimation but require
substantially higher implementation overhead or can
be applied only in specific settings (e.g. file sharing).
Our comparison of the results given in [10] and [21] and
those presented here confirms this claim directly.
5. Future Work
We proposed in this paper a simple probabilistic
method to assess peers’ trustworthiness in a P2P net-
work. Checking precisely its behavior in collusive set-
tings and extending it to be as effective as possible
under this assumption on the peers’ behavior make
the most important part of the future work. This can
be done either by modeling collusions probabilistically
(operating directly on Equation 4.2) or learning the
probabilities of misreporting for every peer in the net-
work separately rather than for the network as a whole.
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